A2A Simulations BONANZA ACCU-SIM V35B, Manual

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ACCU-SIM V35B BONANZA

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SIMULATIONS

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FOR SIMULATION USE ONLY

extend it immediately, but speed brakes are not installed in 
Bonanzas nor in virtually any other general aviation air-
craft. Trying to lower the undercarriage and/or flaps to slow 
down at such a high airspeed is very risky may not work. 
Additionally, doing this is likely to cause just the serious 
structural damage you are trying to avoid. In fact, once you 
are hurtling past the redline there may be no way to avoid 
a tragedy.

With this in mind, it is well to be aware that in nearly 

all fatal Bonanza accidents in which a failure of the air-
craft’s structure was involved, it was determined that the 
aeroplane  had  been  flown  outside  its  normal  flight  enve-
lope  (i.e.,  flying  too  damn  fast).  In  most  instances  these 
accidents were preceded by loss of control due to the pilot’s 
apparent misinterpretation of the aeroplane’s situation 
causing him/her to make incorrect control inputs, exacer-
bating rather than correcting the problem.

When Bonanza was introduced in 1947, very few pilots 

were trained or competent to fly in what is called “instru-
ment  flight  rules”  (IFR)  conditions,  which  are  essentially 
those in which the pilot is unable to see the horizon and is 
unable  to  accurately  and  safely  fly  the  aeroplane  without 
reference to instruments. At this time not even many ex- 
military pilots had much IFR training or experience and the 
vast majority of civilian pilots had even less. The IFR navi-
gation system, so sophisticated, efficient and ubiquitous in 
modern times, was in its bare infancy in early 1950s and 
virtually non- existent in the late 1940s. In that era gyro-
scopic instruments, common today and which are a crucial 
aid  during  IFR  flight,  were  not  standard  or  even  available 
equipment in early Bonanzas and most of the other general 
aviation aeroplanes.

When the weather obscures or completely hides the hori-

zon,  safe  flight  becomes  dependant  upon  the  pilot’s  abil-
ity to fly the aeroplane with sole reference to and reliance 
upon what instruments may be on the panel. Yes, IFR flying 
can be done without gyros and learning to do so is a part of 
IFR training, but doing this effectively requires professional 
instruction and lots of practice.

Unless an auto- 

pilot has been engaged, even a well- 

trimmed aeroplane will not maintain straight and level 
flight by itself for very long. Even assuming perfectly calm 
winds (which is rarely the case, particularly at altitude,) the 
torque of the engine and propeller causes a steady left bank-
ing tendency which is likely to go unnoticed unless the pilot 
has reference to the horizon (real or gyroscopic), the terrain 
and/or notices that the aircraft’s compass heading is slowly 
changing.

An ordinary magnetic compass (sometimes called a 

“whisky compass” for its visible yellow/brown- coloured 
lubricating oil) is notoriously inaccurate and misleading 
under many flight conditions and is considered to be unre-
liable as the sole source of heading information during IFR 
flight. An aeroplane out of true rigging, subtle trim inaccu-
racies, gusts of wind and/or turbulence may cause pitch and 
roll changes as well, all of which may also go unnoticed by a 
pilot not trained to fly in IFR conditions.

As mentioned, pilots have reported that “V”- 

tail 

Bonanzas are very light and sensitive in pitch to the extent 
that flying a “V”- tail Bonanza has been described as being 
“sportscar- like.” Also, “V”- tail Bonanzas are notoriously 
unsteady in pitch and roll, tending to constantly “seek” 
pitch position and laterally wander from level flight. Beech 
designed Bonanza for maximum performance with little to 
no  considerations  or  compromises  for  flight  by  low- time 
pilots. Whilst Bonanza’s “sportscar- like” – perhaps even 
“warbird- like” – flight characteristics may be quite satis-
fying to an experienced pilot, when in IFR conditions these 
characteristics are likely to create an unintended and unno-
ticed banked, nose down condition. When these are com-
bined what is called a “spiral dive” is likely to occur.

Over many decades of close and diligent study of fatal 

general  aviation  aircraft  accidents  and  reports  from  flight 
instructors, the loss of a visual horizon has been cited as the 
most common cause of the spiral dive phenomenon and the 
fatal accident which soon and inevitably follows. It has been 
determined by a number of flight instructors that if a pilot 
without an instrument rating tries to turn around in IFR 
conditions to fly back to clear weather he /she is likely to 
mishandle the turn by not applying sufficient back pressure 
on the yoke/stick, thereby allowing the nose to drop. Add to 
this banked attitude the aerodynamically clean Bonanza’s 
tendency to quickly accelerate to and beyond its redline 
(Vne) when the nose drops, and therein exists a formula 
for catastrophe that is, as is said, “Just waiting to happen.”

What happens all- too- often is this: a pilot inadvertently 

and/or negligently flies into a low - visibility weather con-
dition and soon loses sight of the horizon. If not trained to 
fly  in  IFR  conditions  and  relying  upon  his/her  “senses,”

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he/she “feels” that all is well all whilst the left wing has 
already slightly dropped and, because the aeroplane is no 
longer flying level, the nose has also begun to drop. As men-
tioned, this situation is exacerbated if this pilot attempts a 
turn in IFR conditions. What this pilot usually then hears 
is the rising sound of the outside air flow and immediately 
sees  the  airspeed  indicator  needle  quickly  rising.  He/she 
naturally pulls back on the control wheel to alleviate this 
but, because the aeroplane’s wings are no longer level, up 
elevator input only steepens the left bank which, accord-
ingly, causes the nose to drop further. Meanwhile, airspeed 
continues to increase until it is quickly well past the redline 
as the pilot frantically but vainly pulls back even harder on 
the control wheel to slow the airplane. This continues for 
only a short while until either the wings and/or tail struc-
tures fail or the aeroplane contacts the ground in a sharp 
nose- down left bank at a very high speed.

This is, in fact, what apparently happened to John 

Kennedy, Jr. on July 16, 1999 when his high- performance, 
high- 

powered and aerodynamically clean Piper PA32R 

“Saratoga,” which he had recently purchased and in which 
he  had  little  flight  time,  crashed  into  the  Atlantic  Ocean 
off  the  coast  of  Martha’s  Vineyard,  Massachusetts,  kill-
ing all three on board (Kennedy, his wife Carolyn and his 
sister- in- law Lauren Bessette). On that day, Kennedy had