Final
Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022
22
2.
Analysis
2.1
General
The Commander and the trainee second officer Copilot were appropriately licensed and
medically fit to operate the flight. The Investigation found no evidence that physical, physiological,
or psychological conditions affected the flight crew performance.
The Aircraft was maintained in accordance with the maintenance program approved by
the General Civil Aviation Authority of the United Arab Emirates (GCAA), and there were no
technical anomalies prior to the Incident.
The dry environmental conditions prevailing during the afternoon daylight takeoff were
within the Aircraft's operating limitations. Additionally, there was no significant weather affecting the
Airport operations, and visibility was more than 10 kilometers.
The Aircraft was correctly configured for the takeoff with flap setting at 1+F, and engine
thrust setting at FLX/MCT (Flex temperature of 67 degrees Celsius). The calculated take-off speeds
were V
1
: 122 knots; V
R
: 127 knots; and V
2
: 130 knots.
Sharjah International Airport (OMSJ) was the main base for the Operator. The Operator
was allowed by the airport authority to perform intersection takeoffs. Intersection takeoff at OMSJ
was considered a normal and safe operation for the Operator and was frequently used without any
issues. Within the two months before the Incident, the majority of departures were intersection
takeoffs from Bravo 14 for runway 30.
2.2
Flight Operations
– Taxi and Take-off Execution
The performed takeoff was a
“rolling takeoff”, which, as per the Commander’s and
Copilot‘s statements, was planned and briefed. The Copilot stated that she called for the
before
takeoff checklist
‘below the line’ after Tower issued clearance for takeoff from runway 30. The
Investigation was unable to confirm if the checklist ‘below the line’ was completed prior to the
Aircraft parking brakes being selected OFF or after the Aircraft started moving from runway holding
point Bravo 14.
Nine seconds after the Commander correctly read back ATC take-off clearance for
departure from runway 30, autobrake MAX deceleration rate was set, the parking brake was
selected OFF and shortly after the Aircraft started to move beyond Bravo 14 holding point. The
Copilot started gradual increments of engine thrust beyond idle about 51 seconds after the parking
brake was selected OFF. After another 22 seconds, with the Aircraft's ground speed increasing and
passing 20 knots, the Copilot almost simultaneously applied a nose down sidestick input and
advanced both thrust leavers to FLX/MCT detent. Because there was no need to stop the Aircraft
on the runway, the Copilot continued to steer and align the Aircraft onto runway 12 centerline for
the rolling takeoff.
When the Copilot noticed that the FMA was not indicating RWY, she realized that the
Aircraft not aligned to the pre-selected runway which was entered to the flight management system
(FMS). However, she announced the FMA modes but not RWY mode as it was blank.
After the callout by the Copilot, the Commander quickly decided to continue the takeoff
and advanced both thrust levers to the takeoff/go-around (TOGA) detent position with the Aircraft
speed passing 57 knots calibrated airspeed (CAS). Unknown to the flight crew, the remaining
runway 12 available for an accelerate-stop was about 730 meters.
