Final
Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022
32
(e)
The controller was relieved from duty after the Incident.
(f)
The air traffic control operations were conducted from a standby tower located above the
airport fire services.
(g)
The view from the standby tower had surveillance deficiencies identified during the safety
case assessment.
(h)
As part of risk- mitigation for the identified hazards, a remote surface management system
(RSMS) was installed, which included closed-circuit television (CCTV).
3.2.5
Findings relevant to Sharjah International Airport
(a)
There was no study prepared by the airport for determining the operational need for
intersection take-off sign indicating the take-off run available (TORA).
(b)
The airport operator complied with the requirements of the
Civil Aviation Regulations
for
the taxiways and runway 12/30 and installed the necessary markings, lighting, stop bars
and signage.
(c)
The lead-on lights were functional and centerline marking was visible from runway holding
point Bravo 14 to runway 30 and if followed, would avoid runway confusion.
(d)
The airport was not equipped with ground movement radar (GMR) system.
3.3
Causes
The Air Accident Investigation Sector of United Arab Emirates (AAIS) determines that the
cause of the runway confusion was the Copilot steering the Aircraft right onto the wrong runway
during a rolling takeoff.
Entry to the wrong runway was due to degraded situation awareness of the Aircraft
direction by both flight crewmembers due to lack of external peripheral visual watch and runway
confirmation.
3.4
Contributing Factors to the Serious Incident
A contributing factor to the Incident was that the air traffic controller did not monitor the
Aircraft movement after take-off clearance was given.