Final
Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022
28
Although the Investigation could not confirm that whether or not the existence of TORA
information at the intersection could have prevented entering the wrong runway, the Investigation
believes that such information would have enhanced the flight crew situation awareness of the
remaining runway available. Therefore, the Investigation recommends that the airport operator
performs a risk assessment for fixing a sign illustrating the TORA at the intersection takeoff as
stated in
CAR Part IX
.
2.5
Air Traffic Control
2.5.1
Standby tower
Sharjah Air Navigation Service (SANS) was the responsible organization for providing air
navigation services and aerodrome monitoring services of aircraft and vehicle movements from the
standby tower. The installed closed-circuit television (CCTV) was part of the surface management
system (RSMS). In addition, monitors in the tower room were installed to aid the controllers in
monitoring aircraft movement on the apron, taxiways, and runway.
The Investigation noted that monitoring of aircraft taxiing to Bravo 14 intersection and unto
runway 12/30 was obstructed by a light pole which was located at the aircraft parking stand at a
short distance from the tower. As Bravo 14 intersection with runway 12/30 was not covered by the
CCTV, and Bravo 14 was about 1 kilometer from the tower, the controllers needed to physically
move and sometimes use binoculars to visually watch a movement of aircraft or vehicle.
When SANS carried out a risk assessment for utilizing the standby tower, the intersection
takeoffs were not registered as hazards, consequently, neither associative risk was analyzed, nor
mitigations were considered.
The Investigation does not see that the surveillance deficiency at the standby tower was
a factor in this Incident because the controller had other aids to monitor ABY111. However, the
Investigation recommends that SANS perform a safety case assessment and mitigate risks
associated with intersection take-off hazards.
2.5.2
Controllers communication and movement monitoring
The Investigation review of the air traffic controller
’s communication with ABY111 was
clear and unambiguous and was not a factor in this Incident. Similarly, the combined Tower and
the Ground control did not affect the capability of the controller to respond to requests received
from the flight crew of aircraft moving on the ground and flights in the vicinity, and provide accurate
traffic information.
It took 80 seconds from the time the take-off clearance was issued to ABY111 until the
Aircraft became out of CCTV Camera 1 coverage. Due to the angle of Camera 1, SANS had stated
that it was not possible to know the direction in which the Aircraft's nose was turning. The controller
was busy visual scanning the ground and airborne movements including some critical checks such
as aircraft holding short of runway 30 at Bravo 20 holding point. Thereafter, there was a period of
silence of about 82 seconds on Tower and Ground frequencies until ABY189 queried the controller
about the runway in use.
The Investigation could not exactly identify the exact scanning technique applied by the
controller in the 80 seconds after take-off clearance was given for ABY111 especially as the aircraft
at the Bravo 20 holding point had already confirmed to Tower they had stopped and no other aircraft
was on approach for runway 30. Due to the distance of Bravo 14 intersection as well as the known
surveillance impediments at the standby tower, the scanning techniques employed by the controller
has to be comprehensive so that they maintain situational awareness of aircraft on the taxiways
and runway.
