Final
Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022
30
3.
Conclusions
3.1
General
From the available evidence, the following findings, causes, and contributing factors were
determined with respect to this Incident. These shall not be read as apportioning blame or liability
to any particular organization, or individual.
To serve the objective of this Investigation, the following sections are included in the
Conclusions heading:
Findings.
Statements of all significant conditions, events or circumstances in this
Incident. The findings are significant steps in the Incident sequence but they are not
always causal nor do they indicate deficiencies.
Causes.
Actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which led
to the Incident.
Contributing factors.
Actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination
thereof, which, if eliminated, avoided or absent, would have reduced the probability
of the Incident occurring, or mitigated the severity of the consequences of the
Accident. The identification of contributing factors does not imply the assignment of
fault or the determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability.
3.2
Findings
3.2.1
Findings relevant to the Aircraft
(a)
The Aircraft was certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with the existing
requirements of the
Civil Aviation Regulations
of the United Arab Emirates.
(b)
The Aircraft records indicated that it was airworthy when dispatched for the flight.
(c)
The No. 3 main wheel tire sustained cuts because of impact with an approach light during
the Aircraft liftoff from runway 12.
3.2.2
Findings relevant to the flight crew
(a)
The flight crewmembers were licensed and qualified for the flight in accordance with the
existing requirements of the
Civil Aviation Regulations
of the United Arab Emirates.
(b)
Both crewmembers were fit for duty.
(c)
The Commander was a certified flight instructor.
(d)
The Copilot was a second officer undergoing a multi-pilot license (MPL) training program.
(e)
Both flight crewmembers conducted together 4-day pairing.
(f)
In day 1 and day 2 of the pairing, the Copilot performed an intersection takeoff from Bravo
6 for runway 12 on each day.
(g)
The takeoff from the incorrect runway occurred on day 4 of the pairing.
3.2.3
Findings relevant to the flight operations
(a)
The Commander briefed the Copilot about conducting a single-engine taxi and a rolling
takeoff.
(b)
The Copilot was the pilot flying and was responsible for taxiing the Aircraft.