Final
Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022
31
(c)
The taxi conducted from the parking stand to holding Bravo 14 was a short taxi of about 3
minutes.
(d)
The Commander did not notify the air traffic control about his intention to conduct a rolling
takeoff.
(e)
Before takeoff checklist
was completed in the vicinity of runway 12/30 holding point Bravo
14.
(f)
The Commander read back the Tower take-off clearance correctly with the confirmation
of runway 30.
(g)
The Copilot entered the runway following a taxi line for runway 12.
(h)
Neither the Commander nor the Copilot confirmed runway 30 direction after take-off
clearance was given by Tower.
(i)
When the thrust levers were advanced to FLX/MCT, the Copilot called out that the flight
mode annunciator (FMA) was not indicating RWY.
(j)
The Commander realized that the Aircraft was on the wrong runway when the Aircraft
CAS was at about 57 knots.
(k)
The Commander took control of the Aircraft
and decided to continue the takeoff.
(l)
The Commander increased the engine thrust to takeoff/go-around (TOGA), and nine
seconds later, he changed the flap configuration to Flaps 2.
(m)
The Copilot was applying a nose down attitude on the sidestick up until the Aircraft rotated.
(n)
The Commander did not attempt to use the sidestick priority.
(o)
The Commander acted as the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring during take-off roll and
climb.
(p)
The Commander stated that the Copilot was “frozen and startled.”
(q)
The Aircraft liftoff occurred at about 30 meters beyond the end of runway 12 from the
runway safety area.
(r)
The Commander did not notify the Operator about the Incident.
(s)
The Commander continued the flight to the destination and returned the pilot flying duties
to the Copilot.
(t)
During the Aircraft liftoff from the runway safety area, one approach light for runway 30
was damaged.
(u)
The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recordings for the Incident were overwritten.
3.2.4
Findings relevant to air traffic control
(a)
The air traffic controller was licensed and was medically fit.
(b)
The controller did not detect that the Aircraft had turned right and had commenced the
takeoff from runway 12.
(c)
The controller became aware of the Aircraft taking off from the wrong runway about eight
seconds before the Aircraft was airborne.
(d)
The controller was responsible for both Tower and the Ground frequencies when the
Incident occurred.