FMS DEGRADED OPERATION
2 OVERVIEW
Independent mode
F
F
M
M
G
G
C
C
1
1
M
M
C
C
D
D
U
U
1
1
F
F
M
M
G
G
C
C
2
2
M
M
C
C
D
D
U
U
2
2
F
F
M
M
G
G
C
C
1
1
M
M
C
C
D
D
U
U
1
1
F
F
M
M
G
G
C
C
2
2
M
M
C
C
D
D
U
U
2
2
F
F
M
M
G
G
C
C
1
1
M
M
C
C
D
D
U
U
1
1
F
F
M
M
G
G
C
C
2
2
M
M
C
C
D
D
U
U
2
2
The two FMSs are healthy, but
conditions exist to prevent
communication with each other or the
FMSs are in disagreement.
Single mode
One of the two FMSs has failed.
This mode supersedes both the DUAL
and INDEPENDENT modes (e.g. a FMGC
fails while in the INDEPENDENT mode,
the remaining FMGC reverts to the
SINGLE mode).
Note:
If FM is failed, FMGC is out of order.
MCDU failure
Failure may affect the MCDU only.
In this case FMGC access is limited to
the onside operative MCDU.
J43126AA 00
© THALES AVIONICS S.A.
AIRBUS A318/319/320/321
Summary of Contents for FMGS
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