7
IPsec VPN
121
PFS
With
Perfect
Forwarding
Secrecy
(PFS)
disabled,
initial
keying
material
is
“created”
during
the
key
exchange
in
phase
‐
1
of
the
IKE
negotiation.
In
phase
‐
2
of
the
IKE
negotiation,
encryption
and
authentication
session
keys
will
be
extracted
from
this
initial
keying
material.
By
using
PFS,
completely
new
keying
material
will
always
be
created
upon
re
‐
key.
Should
one
key
be
compromised,
no
other
key
can
be
derived
using
that
information.
PFS
can
be
used
in
two
modes:
the
first
is
PFS
on
keys,
where
a
new
key
exchange
will
be
performed
in
every
phase
‐
2
negotiation.
The
other
type
is
PFS
on
identities,
where
the
identities
are
also
protected,
by
deleting
the
phase
‐
1
SA
every
time
a
phase
‐
2
negotiation
has
been
finished,
making
sure
no
more
than
one
phase
‐
2
negotiation
is
encrypted
using
the
same
key.
PFS
is
generally
not
needed,
since
it
is
very
unlikely
that
any
encryption
or
authentication
keys
will
be
compromised.
It
is
enabled
in
the
SEG
by
specifying
one
or
more
DH
groups
for
the
IPsec
proposal.
IPsec
encryption
The
encryption
algorithm
that
will
be
used
on
the
protected
IPsec
traffic.
This
is
not
needed
when
AH
is
used,
or
when
ESP
is
used
without
encryption.
IPsec
authentication
This
specifies
the
authentication
algorithm
used
on
the
protected
traffic.
This
is
not
used
when
ESP
is
used
without
authentication,
although
it
is
not
recommended
to
use
ESP
without
authentication.
IPsec
lifetime
This
is
the
lifetime
of
the
VPN
connection.
It
is
specified
in
both
time
(seconds)
and
data
amount
(kilobytes).
Whenever
either
of
these
values
is
exceeded,
a
re
‐
key
will
be
initiated,
providing
new
IPsec
encryption
and
authentication
session
keys.
If
the
VPN
connection
has
not
been
used
during
the
last
re
‐
key
period,
the
connection
will
be
terminated,
and
re
‐
opened
from
scratch
when
the
connection
is
needed
again.
This
value
must
be
set
lower
than
the
IKE
lifetime.
Diffie-Hellman groups
Diffie
‐
Hellman
(DH)
is
a
cryptographic
protocol
that
allows
two
parties
that
have
no
prior
knowledge
of
each
other
to
establish
a
shared
secret
key
over
an
insecure
communications
channel
through
a
series
of
plain
text
exchanges.
Even
though
the
exchanges
between
the
parties
might
be
monitored
by
a
third
party,
Diffie
‐
Hellman
makes
it
extremely
difficult
for
the
third
party
to
determine
what
the
agreed
shared
secret
key
is
and
to
decrypt
data
that
is
encrypted
using
the
key.